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Key Messages
 Isabelle Stengers’ critique of 21st-century science points to the need to change how we relate to the
subjects that we study, under the umbrella of “slow science.”
 Human geographer William Bunge’s notion of geographical expedition may be a means of doing this,
even if “expedition” is a term to be used cautiously.
 Slow science may allow a more creative and critical Physical Geography centred on the very curiosity
that makes being a scientist so interesting.
Physical Geography has evolved to become a highly productive mainstream natural science, delivering on the
metrics required by the accounting systems dominating the neoliberal University. I argue that the result has
been: (1) a crisis of over-production (of more articles than we are capable of consuming); (2) a risk of under-
production (growing scarcity in our ability to produce the research questions needed to sustain our
productivity); and (3) a “disciplinary ﬁx” involving either pursuit of the problem-solving implicit in the
neoliberal impact agenda or creative destruction, aligning ourselves less with geography and more with the
natural sciences. Using Isabelle Stengers’ critique of 21st-century science, I argue for a slowing down in
Physical Geography, by changing how we relate to the subjects that we study. I use the ideas of William
Bunge to discuss the notion of geographical expedition as a means of achieving slow science, even if
“expedition” is a term to be used cautiously. I illustrate these points from one of my own projects to show how
slow science may allow creation of those moments that might lead to a more creative and critical Physical
Geography centred on the very curiosity that makes being a scientist so interesting.
Keywords: Isabelle Stengers, David Harvey, William (Bill) Bunge, Critical Physical Geography, slow science
« Slow Science », l’expedition geographique et la geographie physique critique
Au ﬁl du temps, la geographie physique est devenue une science naturelle conventionnelle et tres productive
repondant aux exigences des parametres des systemes comptables du monde universitaire neoliberal. Je suis
d’avis qu’il en ressort: (1) une crise de surproduction (d’un nombre d’articles qui depasse notre capacite
d’appropriation); (2) un risque de sous-production (une attrition croissante de notre capacite a poser les
questions de recherche requises pour soutenir notre productivite); et (3) un « positionnement disciplinaire »
caracterise soit par la resolution des enjeux prioritaires de recherche appliquee inherents aux preoccupations
neoliberales, soit par la destruction creatrice en se conformant aux sciences de la nature aux depens de la
geographie. Partant de la critique que formule Isabelle Stengers a propos des sciences au 21e siecle, je plaide
en faveur d’un ralentissement de la geographie physique en faisant evoluer la faScon dont nous nous
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rapportons a nos sujets d’etude. Les idees defendues par William Bunge forment le point de depart d’une
discussion portant sur la notion d’expedition geographique pour le developpement de « slow science », me^me
si le terme « expedition » doit e^tre interprete avec precaution. Les projets que j’ai realises servent d’exemples
pour montrer de quelle maniere « slow science » pourrait contribuer a la mise en place des conditions
favorables a l’emergence d’une geographie physique plus creative et critique qui met en valeur le sens de la
curiosite propre aux scientiﬁques.
Mots cles : Isabelle Stengers, David Harvey, William (Bill) Bunge, geographie physique critique, slow science
Introduction
We are scientists. We don’t blog. We don’t twitter. We
take our time.
The Slow Science Movement 2010
In 1972, David Harvey presented a paper that
was to become seminal to the discipline: “Revolu-
tionary and counter revolutionary theory in Geog-
raphy and the problem of ghetto formation.”
Whilst its origins can be traced back into the
1960s, by the early 1970s there was a growing
sense that geography needed a second revolution,
one which would allow “a greater professional
involvement with matters of contemporary social
concern . . . geography in the universities needs to
become more responsive to the social awareness
of the new generation of students brought up in
the modern era of protest and activism” (Smith
1971, 154). Smith goes on to argue that a “critical
review of the scope of geography is long overdue”
because “we appear to have been so tightly locked
into traditional ways of structuring our knowledge
of the world, so deeply committed to existing
paradigms, and recently so preoccupied with
techniques and methodology” (1971, 156). This
shift to a more radical and more critical geography
was not just about making geography more
relevant, it was “a political critique of the entire
mode of social scientific knowledge production
and the professional expertise that promised
social scientists privileged access to power”
(Heyman 2007, 101).
Notwithstanding this shift in Human Geography,
and despite important forays into epistemological
alternatives to conventionally assumed modes of
(natural) scientific knowledge production within
Physical Geography (e.g., Rhoads and Thorn 1996),
the revolution was largely but not exclusively
anodyne to physical geographers who carried on
as normal (Demeritt 1996; Lane 2001). Even in an
era, the Anthropocene, when the human drivers of
environmental change have become more strongly
the focus of research attention in Physical Geogra-
phy, it is largely assumed that the professional
expertise of physical geographers gives them
privileged access to accounts of that change (see,
for example, Johnston 2012). Recently, more than
four decades after what went on to become a
revolution in thinking in Human Geography, Lave
et al. (2014, 2––3) call for the “active integration of
physical and critical human geography, as demon-
strated in the work of geographers who combine
critical attention to relations of social power with
deep knowledge of a particular field of biophysical
science or technology in the service of social and
environmental transformation” in a “new integra-
tive intellectual practice” that they call Critical
Physical Geography. Debates over the relative
merits of a better integration of the discipline
are commonplace (e.g., Johnston 1983, 1998;
Gregory 1992; Liverman 1999; Sluyter et al.
2006) but I find myself deeply seduced by the
argument of Lave et al. (2014). This is not only
because it captures the notion that humans and
the environment are at once both constitutive of
and constituted by their continual interaction—
and as such are co-produced in ways that cause us
to interrogate simplistic accounts of human im-
pacts upon the environment. It is also because I
find myself increasingly convinced of the need for
a more critical account of current Physical Geogra-
phy (see also Tadaki et al. 2015). My aim in this
paper is not to revisit Lave et al.’s case. Rather it
is to argue, following Harvey (1972, 110) for a
revolution in (Physical) Geography that might
address what I see as the deeply disturbing form
that Physical Geography as a discipline has become
in the 21st century.
My argument has three stages. First, I describe a
political economy of Physical Geography, after
Harvey (1981), as an analysis of the state that I
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perceive the discipline to be in. Second, I draw
upon the ideas of a Belgian philosopher of science,
Isabelle Stengers (2013), to make the case that
central to a Critical Physical Geography(ical)
project is a ralentissement in Stengers’ phrasing,
that is a slowing down of geographical enquiry.
Third, I reflect upon ways in which this might be
done and, paralleling my own experience in a
project where we had to slow down our normal
ways of working, I revisit Bunge’s (e.g., 1979)
notion of a “geographical expedition.” This latter
stage is important because the forces that run
counter to the kind of slowing down that I believe
Physical Geography needs are so powerful (e.g., see
Halffman and Radder 2015) that change will only
be achieved through our physical displacement
to the sites of geographical knowledge production
that bring us, as physical geographers, to
challenge the ways of working that these forces
sustain. Thus, following Tadaki et al. (2015), I
propose one kind of site that might enable physical
geographers to approach their work in a more
critical setting.
Towards a political economy of
Physical Geography
Implicit in Harvey’s account is that invoking a
revolution in (physical) geographical thought must
attend to both the analytical (that is the state thatwe
are in) and the normative (the state that we should
endeavour to become). Whilst a perceived lack of a
shared geographical project is nothing new for the
discipline (e.g., Demeritt 1996; Sluyter et al. 2006),
my reflection on 21st-century Physical Geography
suggests to me a number of traits. First, in a turn-
of-the-century review of Physical Geography in the
United Kingdom (UK), Thrift argued how it had
evolved into “big” and “mainstream” science:
Recently, physical geography has come out fighting
and the battleground it has chosen has been main-
stream science . . . This success is built on the basis of
a different model from the one of everything model
which tended to operate in the past. Nowdepartments
are trying to build up science groups of five or six
good people and appropriate technicians who can
then seek out large amounts of research money with
which to fund equipment, postdoctoral fellows and
postgraduates. And the money they have been able to
draw on has produced some spectacular scientific
products. (Thrift 2002, 291)
Whether this applies to 21st-century Physical
Geography beyond the UK could be debated but as
Whatmore (2013, 85) observed, “As the contents of
disciplinary journals and the publication habits of
those working in the two wings of the discipline
attest, both are commonly more conversant with
work in cognate disciplines through common fields
of interest (such as urban studies or glaciology) than
with each other’s,” something that is increasing the
outward valence rather than the internal cohesionof
the discipline (Clifford 2002). Clifford argues that
this big science model “relies on the culturing-in of
its adherents, and the culturing-out of its oppo-
nents” (2002, 432), that is, the active creation of a
particular set of acceptable scientific questions and
associated methodologies. The extent to which this
is being actively encouraged is reflected in my own
experience. Shortly after I arrived in my current
University I was informed that Geography was to
be restructured, resulting in social science––facing
geographers joining researchers in planning and
environmental ethics to create an Institute of
Geography and Sustainability, and physical geogra-
phers joining soil scientists, ecologists, and geo-
chemists in an Institute of Earth Surface Dynamics.
Crucially, I was not a passive actor in this process,
but actively and constructively involved in ques-
tioning the logic of maintaining a research institute
(Geography as it was) at the interface of the natural
and social sciences. I found myself swept along by
something that I found rather attractive (a project
thatwould unite a number of natural science––facing
colleagues with largely shared research interests
and approaches)—albeit paradoxically so, given
that we apparently find ourselves in a new geologi-
cal epoch, the Anthropocene, where we cannot
separate out humans from the kinds of physical
geographical questions that interest us, and despite
claims otherwise (see Johnston 2012).
Second, a key element of this mainstream natural
science is the progressive engagement with ques-
tions regarding global change (Castree 2014) and
human impacts upon global systems. Yet, and with
some notable exceptions in relation to, for example,
urban ecology (e.g., Francis 2014), hydrology (e.g.,
Lane 2014), and rivers (e.g., Ashmore 2015), there
has been a marked lack of engagement of physical
geographers in questions that genuinely integrate
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social and natural science, particularly within global
change projects. My sense, in very general terms, is
that the global change agenda is valued in Physical
Geography as a justification for investment in
natural field experiments. The locus of such experi-
ments (e.g., a glaciological focus on theworld’s large
ice sheets) increasingly reflects this justification
(e.g., ice sheet impacts on sea level rise), perhaps to
the exclusion of other loci of enquiryi (such as cities,
which might be equally threatened by reduced
reliability of glacier-stored water suppliesii). There
are scale effects here (Richards and Clifford 2008):
how do we reconcile the chronic (i.e., distant in
space and time) but potentially catastrophic (e.g.,
sea level rise) impacts of global change with the
acute preoccupations of those whose livelihoods
are already marginal, whether due to the natural
environment or the human environment, or some
combination thereof? Of course, global change
questions may become more acutely visible in
places where there are fewer people. The choice of
landscapes that either largely exclude humans or
that allow the human content of scientific enquiry to
be stripped of its human dimensions (e.g., reduced
to discrete effects like rising greenhouse gas
concentrations, land use change, dam removal),
allows the physical geographermore easily tomimic
the kind of scientific experiment-control character-
istic of other natural sciences. But this leads to a
tension between the continued, perhaps growing
need to justify society’s investment in Physical
Geography, and the impacts of this investment, as a
contribution to answering chronic questions sur-
rounding global change; and those acute challenges
that are to be found in the messy interactions
between people and their environment, and where
the multitude of interacting factors makes conven-
tional (“scientific”) research design difficult, even
impossible. Perhaps this is why Physical Geography
remains fundamentally desensitized to more mean-
ingful engagements at the interface between the
natural and the social. This is not to belittle physical
geographical investigations under the umbrella of
global change science but more to challenge them,
from twodimensions. First, a focus onglobal change
science is not neutral if it begs its own question
(the principle of petitio principii)—that is, global
change is used to justify investment in certain kinds
of research only for that research to argue that
global change should be aprimary concernof policy.
Second, as Castree (2016, 14) has recently argued,
the “raison d’e^tre” of a truly geographical project
may well be the intellectual spaces that allow us to
“connect the epistemological ‘fragments’ of our
discipline and thereby make visible life’s socio-
environmental fabric (where other disciplines fixate
on the threads).”What other discipline has this kind
of intellectual space?
These first two broader concerns regarding
the contemporary focus of Physical Geography
combine with further issues that apply to the
academymore generally. Third, Physical Geography
has become incredibly productive, if productivity is
interpreted as academic journal articles (Gregory
et al. 2014). When I was starting doctoral research
(1991), Thomson Reuters’ analysis tells me that
the category “Physical Geography” was producing
around 1,200 scientific articles per year. By 2014,
this had risen to 8,603, a growth that is well
described by an exponential curve (Figure 1).
Fourth, this productivity is not simply concerned
with more publications, but also an increase in the
speedwithwhichdata canbe collected and analyzed
and by which publications are produced in Physical
Geography and across academia more generally.
The ease with which we can now generate data in
Physical Geographymay have increased to the point
that we have more data than ideas with which to
Figure 1
The growth in publication rates in Physical Geography based upon ISI
analysis showing an exponential ﬁt (dashed line).
iA possible example is the way in which UK glaciologists decamped
from their groundbreaking focus on Alpine glaciers in the 1990s to
the big ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica in the 2000s.
iiReynard et al. (2014) provide a good example.
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interpret them. As a graduate student, I could
measure about 200 data points per hour, to
represent the morphology of the surface of a river
channel. The most advanced laser scanning tech-
nologies can now measure upwards of 106 points
per minute. There has been a revolution in informa-
tion technology, making data analysis and writing
quicker and easier. Internet and associated commu-
nications mean that reviewing and publishing work
is more rapid.iii The journal Nature recently trialled
a system where authors could speed up the peer
review process by paying reviewers to turn articles
around more rapidly.iv Open Access journals have
pioneered Open Review where a paper is published
on line, after some editorial checks, even before it is
reviewed. Not only do we have much more to read,
but the quality of what we are reading is becoming
much less clear, and finding those papers that really
do change the way we think has become harder.
Writing and seeking citations seem to have been
given more credence than reading (Halffman and
Radder 2015).
Fifth, as with many other disciplines, physical
geographers have had to contend with a growing
accountability in their work. This has two distinct
dimensions. The first (e.g., Pain 2014; Halffman and
Radder 2015;Mountz et al. 2015) is theway inwhich
this accountability manifests itself as audit. Insti-
tutions are quantitatively assessed with respect to
one another, whether as a compulsory element of
securing research funding (e.g., as in the UK), or as
part of evaluations where the subjects of those
evaluations have no say regarding their inclusion or
not (e.g., World University Rankings). But this
accountability is not just inter-institutional, it is
increasingly intra-institutional, applied to depart-
ments, groups, and individuals, as universities seek
to maximize their performance in the competitions
to which they are exposed (Halffman and Radder
2015). The second is perhaps more insidious
because it increasingly makes research the subject
of political direction, undermining long-established
faith that researchers and not politicians should
decide research funding.v Research Impact has
become a new unit of currency, where impact is
defined as thatworkwhich benefits society (ormore
narrowly the jurisdiction of the government that is
funding the research) and not academia (e.g.,
teaching or scholarship).vi The impact shift has
paralleled the growth of Mode 2 science (Nowotny
et al. 2001), in which curiosity-driven enquiry is
increasingly replaced by “identified problems” as
the motivation for research (Brewer 1999; Tress
et al. 2005). As the need for research to have impact
has developed, it is not surprising that policy-
relevance and interdisciplinarity have co-evolved:
interdisciplinarity has a clear logic (Barry et al. 2008)
for problem-driven research where the supposed
complexity and urgency of particular problems
“precludes the luxury of assessing things from a
unique perspective using a unique conceptual
framework” (Aligica 2004, 68). Crucially, the shift
towards Mode 2 science, which is rarely criticized
(but see Barry et al. 2008 as an exception), raises
fundamental questions regarding what and who is
identifying the problems that then invoke the
interdisciplinary analysis necessary for their reso-
lution, as well as what and who then defines the
impact that results.
In reflecting upon the above points, I found
myself revisiting Harvey’s (1972) critique of the
Kuhnian account of scientific paradigm shifts.
Harvey argued that the observation that there has
been some kind of shift is perhaps less important
than understanding why the shift come about, and
in what way. Thus, if the focus of 21st-century
Physical Geography is natural science––facing, prob-
lem-oriented research that must be held to account
in certain ways, then how has this change in focus
come about? Who is defining the kinds of research
that have become the focus of Physical Geography,
whether this is in terms of new ways of working or
problems being defined? Harvey (1972, 114) wrote:
“Immediately the question arises as to who is going
to control whom, inwhose interest is the controlling
going to be, and if control is exercised in the interest
iiiAs a journal editor, it is now not uncommon to get requests for
authors on the progress of their papers after only four weeks.
iv It is perhaps ironic that even this form of rapid publication has
itself to be reported through a device symptomatic of the rapidity
of modern science: the blogosphere. http://blogs.nature.com/
ofschemesandmemes/2015/04/21/fast-track-peer-review-
experiment-first-findings.
vThe classic example of this in the UK is the Haldane principle,
which originated in the early 20th-century. It distinguished
between general research (to be decided upon by politician
independent Research Councils) and commissioned research
where there was legitimate political intervention in research
priorities.
viSee http://impact.ref.ac.uk/CaseStudies/FAQ.aspx for example.
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of all, who is going to take it upon themselves to
define the public interest?”Whilst Harvey’s particu-
lar focuswas uponHumanGeography and the social
sciences, he made his thesis equally with respect to
the natural sciences in describing:
the harnessing of scientific activity, by a process of
patronage and funded research, to the special interest
of those who are in control of the means of
production. The coalition of industry and government
heavily directs scientific activity. This manipulation
and control means manipulation and control in the
interest of a particular group in society rather than in
the interests of society as a whole. (1972, 111)
In Figure 2, I try to use Harvey’s (1981) ideas to
make sense of these observations, somewhat
crudely, to explain the state that Physical Geography
is in as a political economy (Tadaki et al. 2015), a
discipline situated within and structured by the
broader neo-liberal changes observed within the
wider academy (e.g., Meyerhoff et al. 2011; Ball
2012; Mountz et al. 2015; Halffman and Radder
2015). If science has become progressively aligned
towards producing commodities that can be mone-
tarized (e.g., Mirowski 2011), and this alignment is
increasingly used as the hallmark of “good science”
(e.g., its impact on economic growth), then it makes
sense to see the practice of science as part of a
political economy and to subject it to such analysis.
My entry point is the academic system, rather than
the multitude of other sites where science is
practiced, reflecting my interest in a discipline,
Geography, whose science is dominated by Univer-
sities. I conceive of this system as involving two
entities, Labour (academic physical geographers)
and Resources (research questions and finances),
both needed to fuel themeans of production so as to
produce a Surplus. By measuring, analyzing, and
writing, physical geographers produce scientific
articles. The latter are a form of Surplus because
scientific articles are generally framed as an excess
of knowledge over what we know already, that is, in
terms of their originality and significance. Universi-
ties, who own the primary means of production
(Labour), have increasingly required articles to be
the key output of University research activity to the
detriment of other forms of academic publication
(Woodward 2015; Keighren 2016), not least because
of the growth of an associated audit culture (Pain
2014; Rogers et al. 2014; Halffman and Radder
2015). There is, then, a symbiotic relationship
between Labour and Surplus: owners of the means
of production need Labour (academics) both to
produce the Surplus (scientific articles) and also to
consume it (notably to cite them), not least because
certainly in Physical Geography, scientific articles
are rarely read beyond the academy.
Under the assumption that the driver of the
system is the need to maximize Surplus, owners
of the Means of Production, University authorities,
find themselves in competition, whether for Labour
(e.g., hiring of those academicsmost able to produce
Surplus) or Resources (e.g., funding). They may also
maximize their Surplus by improving the efficiency
of the Means of Production through ever-greater
levels of intervention (e.g., targets, mentoring)
(Halffman and Radder 2015; see Meyerhoff et al.
2011; Mountz et al. 2015). Whilst the history of the
Figure 2
A political economy of Physical Geography in the 21st century.
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labour movement did much to address the alterna-
tive to efficiency, that is the lengthening of the
working day, the academic community (i.e., Labour)
has continued to provide an additional and sub-
stantial subsidy through those academics whowork
many more than their contracted number of hours.
Following Harvey (1981), the result of the growing
rate of Surplus is the first of three crises, one of
over-production: we are now producing many more
scientific articles than it is possible to read
(Figure 1). This is partly sustained by the fact that
we cannot only access articles more easily (on-line)
but also search their content without having to read
them. It explains the apparent paradox that we are
not only producing more, we are also citing more.
However, I argue that it threatens the necessary
symbiosis between Labour as producer and Labour
as consumer—unless the owners of the Means of
Production can make sure that the fruits of its
Labour are read (and cited) more than others.
Coping with the crisis first involves reinforcing
competition, such as through the invention of new
ways of diffusing scientific articles that attempt to
get certain articles read aheadof others, for example
through use of social media such as Twitter, Link-
edIn, Facebook, even ResearchGate (see Beven 2016
for a discussion of this in hydrology). The end point
is no longer the publication of an article but rather
the work Labour must do to get their article read
(enable access, blog, tweet, etc.). Reinforcing com-
petition is also achieved through the progressive
reinforcement of accountability by qualifying (e.g.,
journal hierarchies through impact factors, rejec-
tion rates, etc.) what kind of Surplus that Labour
should produce—that is, further intervention in
howLabour is implicated in theMeans of Production
(see Pain 2014). Certain Surplus has become better
appreciated than others, and some kinds of Surplus
(e.g., inter-personal relations, new collaborations,
etc.) receive no credit at all (Pain 2014; Mountz et al.
2015). In addition, there is theprogressive extension
of the Means of Production into the sphere of
Resources, and the whole academic industry devel-
oping within universities and learned societies (e.g.,
grantwritingworkshops) concernedwith improving
Resource availability (e.g., grant success rates).
Rather than funding being the input and the
article (or even the book) the end point, Labour
and Resources become strongly coupled, even inter-
changeable, as successful grant applications
become increasingly an end in themselves. Grant
earners get bought out of all activities other than
research, at best allowing the owners of theMeans of
Production to increase investment in more Labour,
at worst transferring workload to those who have
not obtained funding, leaving them “slogging in the
trenches” (Mountz et al. 2015, 1248).
However, there is a second crisis that follows from
the crisis of over-production, which is more funda-
mental and which without some kind of response,
leads to a condition of under-production. This
defines Resources more widely and shows them to
be finite. Given the growing speed with which high
quality research canbeundertaken andpublished, it
is possible that the research questions that are
needed to sustain research within a discipline,
perhaps the key Resource, are being produced at a
slower rate than they are being answered. A
condition of disciplinary scarcity then arises. Physi-
cal geography is a relatively mature discipline, as it
is primarily concerned with the surface and near-
surface processes that have been relatively accessi-
ble in termsofmeasurement for somedecades. Even
if innovation in the Means of Production allows new
questions to be asked or old questions to be
considered in new ways, if the rate of Surplus
production is faster than the rate of innovation then
original research questions will become progres-
sively more scarce, and a crisis of under-production
will arise.
Following crises of over-production and under-
production, it ismy thesis that the 21st-century state
of Physical Geography can be explained as a third
crisis, not unlike Harvey’s spatial fix (Harvey 1981),
but in this case disciplinary. Faced with a condition
of Resource scarcity, in relation to research ques-
tions, two choices follow. The first is to seize
interdisciplinary opportunities, those questions at
the margins of disciplines that are there simply
because they have traditionally been difficult, or
where the “hard work” of framing a question has
been already done by those with a problem that
needs to be solved. It is not surprising that physical
geographers have found it valuable to sign up to the
interdisciplinary agenda because it is precisely this
agenda that provides new research questions
around which to develop a focus and often wider
Resources (e.g., funding) to support them. The
second option is to create the critical mass of
researchers necessary to seize other kinds of
questions, perhaps those seen traditionally as in
the domains of other disciplines, even building new
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communities with little or no cohesion to traditional
geographical institutions. Such changes may be
interpreted at once as destructive (see Clifford,
2002; Richards and Clifford 2008) for the ways in
which they force physical geographers to develop
new alliances outside of the discipline, an outward
valence rather than an inward cohesion (Clifford
2002); yet creative for the ways in which they
generate new resources (e.g., research domains or
research hypotheses) to be exploited. It is my view
that physical geographers have had no choice but to
embark upon a path of creative destruction given
the wider evolution of the academy. We increasingly
find ourselves with a strange sense of scholarship,
one where we: “self-identify as broad social or
environmental scientists rather than ‘narrow’ geog-
raphers” but “rely on the continuation of something
called ‘geography’ in the universities for our
employment” (Maddrell 2010, 151).
From rapid science to slow science
and the thesis of Isabelle Stengers
Whilst Figure 2 provides a reasonable but partial
analysis of the state of Physical Geography, the
second part of my argument becomes more norma-
tive. That is, what form should a more critical and
reflexive Physical Geography take? What should the
revolution look like? I believe that the forces
associated with Figure 2 are sufficiently embedded
and strong that resistance to them is going to be a
challenge. One way to interpret those challenges
comes from Stengers’ (2013) Une autre science est
possible! and as her argument is normative, I have
used a reading of her workvii as a basis for my own
argument. Others have reached similar readings
(e.g., Caracao 2013). Stengers is concerned with
what science should become, based upon a critique
of the practice of science, broadly defined, which
leads to the notion that we can talk of a political
economyof scientific knowledge. In response to this
critique, and building on earlier ideas (e.g., Stengers
1999), she advocates resistance to the notion
that scientific knowledge should be subject to a
particular authority (Stengers 2013, 15) and to the
“unhealthy character of a science, unable to nourish
an amateur milieu, and (a kind of science) which is
today sorely lacking” (this author’s translation of
Stengers 2013, 26). What is needed is a ralentisse-
ment, captured in a quote from one of Stengers’
earlier papers: “How can we present a proposal
intended not to say what is, or what ought to be, but
toprovoke thought, aproposal that requiresnoother
verification than the way in which it is able to ‘slow
down’ reasoning and create anopportunity to arouse
a slightly different awareness of the problems and
situations mobilising us?” (Stengers 2005, 994), the
kind of interruption advocated by Meyerhoff et al.
(2011). Finally, she argues that this ralentissement
can only come about if science can escape the
constraints of its current practice, through changing
the relativepositionofscientistswith respect to their
science. The formal separation of the researcher and
the researched has to be replaced with a more
nuanced relationship, that allows the researched
to inform, more directly, how it should be
researched, and where the power of experienceviii is
re-recognized and re-appreciated.
Science in the 21st century: A critique
Stengers’ (2013) critique begins with observations
regarding the process of scientific abstraction. She
argues that most science proceeds by identifying
solutions to pressing problems through abstrac-
tion, one that purposely ignores other kinds of
solutions (Stengers 2013, 11). She uses the example
of genetically-modified crops, which may indeed be
the solution to world hunger if a series of other
solutions to the problem (e.g., the redistribution of
wealth; changes in western consumption patterns)
are assumed out of consideration. Mirroring my
description above of how the study of/with people
is rarely a part of physical geographical enquiry,
Stengers critiques science as a process of “purifica-
tion,” where good questions become those that can
be “cleaned up” by abstraction out of local context
(see also Richards and Clifford 2008): “Ce qui
signifie en retour que la question est une ‘bonne
question’, s’adressant a une dimension du
viiStengers (2013) is written in French. I develop my argument in
English but leave in the relevant French phrases, extracted from
the book, as evidence to support my translation and
interpretation.
viii It is perhaps interesting that “experiment” in English translates
to “experience” in French reflecting the ways in which the
Anglophone notion of “experiment” has become more formal-
ized and restrained than the wider linguistic origin of the term.
This formalization is very much the subject of Stengers’ critique.
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phenomene etudiequi est effectivement susceptible
d’e^tre ‘debrouillee’, et donc d’e^tre attribuee a
ce phenomene independamment de son milieu”
(Stengers 2013, 64).
However, Stengers’ criticism is not of abstraction
itself, because she sees this as the strength of
scientific enquiry and the basic of scientific proof
(Stengers 2013), but more the manner by which
abstraction, or purification, is undertaken. Her
argument is that abstraction has become too
sensitive to what particular fields of academic
research define as admissible questions, and so to
the academy. Scientists argue that other questions
cannot and should not be considered because they
will waste time:
D’une maniere ou d’une autre, explicitement ou non,
les scientifiques apprennent a definir comme ‘non
scientifiques’ des questions qui n’appartiennent pas a
leur ‘sillon’, y compris des questions qui importent
d’autres champs academiques, parce que, du point de
vue de leur discipline, s’y interesser signifierait une
‘perte de temps’. Ce serait cede a une tentation a
laquelle ils doivent resister s’ils veulent se comporter
en ‘vrais scientifiques’. (Stengers 2013, 101)
This focus on some questions at the expense of
others is only made possible by developing insensi-
tivity to the reality that is the supposed focus of the
question being posed: “Interroger l’etoffe qui fait le
‘vrai chercheur’ a partir d’une telle hypothese, c’est
interroger une construction au pouvoir redoutable
car elle ne deforme pas la realite mais exige une
insensibilite determinee aux questions que pose
cette realite” (Stengers 2013, 32).
The need for resistance to this lack of sensitivity
The second element of the critique argues for a
resistance to this insensitivity to reality, and more
particularly to thosewhoargue for this insensitivity.
Stengers constructs this as an “economie de la
connaissance” in ways not dissimilar to the political
economy of Physical Geography that I present
above. It has three elements: (1) scientists; (2)
scientific communities; and (3) the wider society
within which science is found.
Stengers’ resistance in relation to scientists is not
a resistance to the notion that scientists should exist
tomake a contribution to the world in which we live.
Rather, it is a resistance to the peculiar privilege that
some scientists seek where, on the one hand, they
wish to maintain their separation from that which
they wish to study, to protect their independence,
but on the other hand they wish to contribute to the
reconfiguration of the societies within which we live
through the results of their research. They want a
double power, both to be independent and to make
interventions because they claim privileged knowl-
edge as they are independent: “Les scientifiques
n’ont jamais ete innocents. La plupart ont pris une
part active, ou non adhere, a la construction
permanente d’une frontiere asymetrique, qui
protegerait leur autonomie, les defendrait contre
les intrus,mais leur permettrait de quitter librement
leurs espaces protegees pour participer a la
redefinition de nos mondes” (Stengers 2013, 128).
She argues that this is understandable, a reaction of
fear, because they imagine that by being perceived
as independent, their interventions, supposedly
unaffected by their personal bias, somehow have
greater worth:
. . . ils ne peuvent pas le dire en public, car ils craignent
que si le public partageait leur savoir de la maniere
dont la science ‘se fait’, il perde confiance, reduise les
propositions scientifiques a l’expression d’intere^ts
particuliers. ‘Les gens’ doivent continuer a croire a la
fable d’une recherche ‘libre’, animee par la seule
curiosite, a la decouverte des mysteres du monde . . . .
(Stengers 2013, 12)
However, Stengers argues that ultimately, this
position of authority is sustained by conformity to a
model, one defined and policed by the scientific
community through its own systems of peer review
(in writing, in promotion). She argues that this
conformity is based upon a brutal competition, of
the kind implicit to the analysis in Figure 2: “les
jeunes chercheurs.e.s, doctorant.e.s. et post-docs
doivent accepter des conditions de travail propre-
ment sacrificielles, une competition sans merci. Ils
sont censes serrer les dents : a la grande aventure de
la curiosite humaine presentee aux enfants s’est
substitue le theme d’une vocation exigeant un
engagement corps et a^mes” (Stengers 2013, 29). It
is one that is not just academic but also personal,
forcing academics to sacrifice their non-academic
lives for academic ones (see Mountz et al. 2015
for similar arguments by geographers), through
over-long working days and overseas travelling:
“de passer les nuits blanches au laboratoire et
de s’absenter lors des nombreux stages et
deplacements a l’etranger que suppose la carriere
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d’une chercheur” (Stengers 2013, 29). It forces
scientists to conform, to grasp at opportunity and
to be continuously flexible:
. . . la competition pour la reconnaissance d’une
‘excellence’ qui est desormais condition de survie
academique aura pour enjeu la ressource rare que
constitue la publication dans une revue de rang A, et
cet enjeu leur imposera de concevoir leur recherche a
partir de ce que demande les revues et de se
conformer aux normes qu’elles imposent: confor-
misme; opportunisme et flexibilite; telle est la formule
d’excellence. (Stengers 2013, 52)
Stengers goes further and argues that resistance
is needednot only to theworking practices that have
grown up around scientists and science, but also to
the way in which scientists have become increas-
ingly locked into the progressive re-orientation of
scientific products towards industry and commerce
(see also Mirowski 2011). This is one dynamic
behind the impact agenda: the technical and
methodological advances of industry sustain the
rapidity of research; and the rapidity of research in
turn produces those who have mastered those
technical and methodological advances that indus-
try then employs. Public funds, as reflected in the
ways in which the impact of research is increasingly
factored into their allocation, nourish this scientist-
industry symbiosis: “Les chercheurs sont tenus a ce
qui est une quasi-loi du silence a propos des liens
que tissent leurs collegues avec l’industrie. Ils sont
tous nourris par des subventions publiques pour
contribuer a l’innovation industrielle . . .” (Stengers
2013, 100). We arrive at a “tyranny of relevance”
(Lave 2014, 509) in which research that is not
commercially valuable is deemed to have little
intellectual value.
Two potential problems follow. The first is that
symbiosis leads to mutual dependence, with the
theoretically separate interests of industry and
research indistinguishable: “Une situation de sym-
biose implique des intere^ts divergents, au risque
permanent que les uns capturent les autres, creant
un rapport simple de dependance” (Stengers 2013,
98). The second problem is that we become unable
to identify the unintended consequences of appar-
ent scientific progress, how the “eggs” that the
academic “chicken” produces might go on to be
used, something that has to be of profound concern
for any discipline related to human relationships
with the environment: “En d’autres termes, la poule
se doit de ‘traiter de maniere superficielle’ ce qui ne
participe pas directement a l’avancee de sa
science et d’ignorer les questions qui pourraient la
faire ralentir et hesiter, s’inquieter de ce qu’on va
faire de ses œufs” (Stengers 2013, 101). It is for this
last reason that we see the basic societal argument
for a need for a science that ismore reflexive, able to
think beyond the confines of the simple cause-effect
models that it so often espouses. For Stengers, this
is about a need for “slow science.”
Towards a slow science: The need for
ralentissement and the repositioning of the
researcher with respect to the researched
To understand the nature of slow science, Stengers
makes it clear that there are two things that it is not.
First, it is not a call to re-establish the privilege that
scientists are left alone to dowhat scientists think is
important: “La lenteur n’est pas une fin en soi et elle
ne resume pas a l’exigence ‘qu’on nous laisse
tranquille’ de chercheurs qui continuent a se penser
en droit de beneficier d’un traitement privilegie”
(Stengers 2013, 80). Being left alone would attend to
neither the fundamental question of how scientific
questions are posed, notably given wider evidence
of the ways in which scientific practices are socially
informed, nor would it make scientists think
through the consequences of the fruits of scientific
enquiry. Second, it is also not a call to restate
the traditional ideal of free and non-partisan
research as all science is motivated in part by
private interests: “ce que l’economie de la connais-
sance est en train de demanteler est la possibilite
d’une recherche qui ne soit pas directement au
service d’intere^ts prives” (Stengers 2013, 91).
Reading Stengers, I found little argument that
ralentissement or slowing down is just about taking
more time, notwithstanding wider concerns that
science (e.g., The Slow Science Academy 2010;
McCabe 2012) and geographical enquiry (e.g.,
Keighren 2016) needs to be slowed. Rather,
Stengers’ notion of ralentissement points to a series
of actions that I have identified in Table 1, which are
less about doing science slowly (see also Mountz
et al. 2015), and more about re-establishing the
kinds of situations that scientists can place them-
selves in relationally with respect to what they
study, that can lead to the combination of curiosity,
creativity, and innovation that makes science so
exciting. In this sense, the ralentissement may well
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be spatial or even scalar (e.g., when we bring other
disciplinary perspectives into our work). It is a
relational repositioning that helps us to challenge
what it is that we think. At base, slow science is
about a commitment more to the subjects of our
study and what is researched, and less to the forces
that shape contemporary academic environments
(Figure 2). The approach being suggested is pro-
foundly empirical (but not in a formal sense)
because it is grounded in the power that experience
has to challenge what it is we think we know and to
resist those forces that might prevent us thinking
Table 1
Interpretation of Stengers (2013) as actions for making a slow science
Action Commentary View of Stengers
1. Acts of
disobedience
Reflecting wider ideas regarding the value of controversy in
scientific research, the role that controversies can play,
notably where they allow a scientist to disobey
conventional wisdom, and to raise other kinds of
questions. Stengers uses the example of GM crops where
environmental safety concerns open up wider questions
regarding global food security, spatial justice, and
dominant accounts of biotechnical solutions to food
shortage.
On peut dire, de ce point de vue, que les actions de
desobeissance civile ont cree, et maintenu ouvert, un
espace de production d’intelligence collective a laquelle je
me definis d’ailleurs comme redevable. (Stengers 2013, 88)
2. Repositioning
of the scientist
A refocusing of the scientist: away from their normal
communities of practice (as scientists) and the abstraction
of investigation out of the milieu of which it is normally a
part; and towards those who ask different questions or
bring other kinds of understanding, normally excluded
from scientific enquiry.
Se situer n’a rien a voir avec le point de vue qu’offre Google
Earth, ou l’on voit la Terre entiere, puis on peut situer sa
ville, sa rue, sa maison. E^tre capable de se situer, de situer
ce qu’on sait, de le lier activement aux questions que l’on
fait importer et aux moyens mis en œuvre pour y repondre,
implique d’e^tre redevable a l’existence des autres, de celles
et ceux qui posent d’autres questions, font importer
autrement une situation, qui peuplent un paysage sur un
mode qui en interdit l’appropriation au nom de quelque
ideal abstrait que ce soit. (Stengers 2013, 49)
3. Readmission of
consequence
The readmission into scientific enquiry of those for whom
scientific research has consequence, ones normally
removed via scientific abstraction.
Il concerne en effet la capacite des scientifiques a participer
a la recreation d’une fiabilite qui implique l’entree en scene
de plein droit tous ceux que les consequences d’une
innovation peuvent concerner, de tous ceux qui sont
porteurs de preoccupations que le mode d’abstraction des
scientifiques ignore. (Stengers 2013, 108)
4. New ways of
working
Dismantling of the normal ways of working that strive to
exclude judgement from scientific practice.
Rien dans leur formation actuelle ne prepare les chercheurs
a ce genre de participation, qui devrait exclure tout
jugement superficiel, toute connivence entre ceux qui
savent. C’est bel et bien un demantelement des habitudes
du professionnel qui est requis. (Stengers 2013, 108)
5. The “art of
consultation”
The need to be able to engage with the subjects of our
research that gives them the power to make us think
differently about them. . .
C’est pourquoi il vaut mieux parler ‘d’art de la consultation’
que de ‘libre debat’ car il ne s’agit pas d’evaluer les merites
des differentes positions, mais de donner a la situation qui
rassemble le pouvoir de faire hesiter chacun quant a la
maniere dont il formule sa position. (Stengers 2013, 110)
6. The “right of
reply”
. . . and to evaluate what it is we think we need to know about
them, that is, to give them a “right of reply” to the
definition of the questions that we pursue.
On pourrait decrire cette pratique comme une tres
particuliere operation ’d’enro^lement’ des phenomenes . . .
En effet, il ne s’agit pas d’obtenir d’eux des reponses aux
questions que les scientifiques se posent, mais aussi, et
me^me d’abord, d’obtenir des reponses qui verifient la
pertinence, pour le phenomene, de la question elle-me^me!
(Stengers 2013, 127–128)
“. . . non certes leur droit de dicter aux scientifiques comme ils
veulent e^tre decrits, mais leur capacite a evaluer la
pertinence de la mise en rapport qui leur est proposee.”
(Stengers 2013, 68)
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otherwise. Thus, slow science is also a direct
challenge to certain interpretations of Mode 2
interdisciplinary science because our experience(s)
should force questions about what the problems
are, which onesmatter, how they should be studied,
andwith what consequence, asmuch as they should
provide definitive answers to questions posed by
others.
Slow science as “geographical
expedition”
If the essence of slow science is a relational change
in the practice of research, the question becomes
how could it and should it come about? There is no
straightforward response to this question because,
following from the historical and structural account
summarized in Figure 2, there is an element of
“lock-in” to existing ways of working: more senior
physical geographers may have a sufficiently sound
position in the subject to take risks, but they are
more likely to be locked into a Mode of Production
whose existence needs to be sustained; more junior
physical geographers are constrained by the serious
consequences of not conforming towhat the system
expects (e.g., in relation to tenure, promotion,
salary). However, if the change is relational, one
way to think about it is to think through the ways in
which amaterial relational repositioning of physical
geographical enquiry can enable slow science.
To illustrate this argument, I draw upon an
example of a relational change associated with an
advocate of the quantitative revolution and theoret-
ical geography in the 1960s. Bunge (1979) provides
an autobiographical account of what became known
as the “Detroit Geographical Expedition and Insti-
tution.”When I read Stengers (2013), and identified
the actions in Table 1, I was struck by the parallels
with Bunge’s (1979) personal account of how he
dissociated himself from the axioms of theoretical
geography and associated himself with a very
different kind of community. This was a community
that theoretical geography was at pains to say
something about but which, through a material
engagement with that community, slowed down
Bunge’s conventional reading, unsettled his accu-
mulated wisdom, and caused him to think in a
markedly different way.
In Table 2, I interpret Bunge’s (1979) personal
account through the ideas in Table 1. He describes
how much of what he did involved acts of disobedi-
ence, whether theoretically in relation to the state of
the United States in the 1960s, or more specifically
through the series of academic moves he took until
he left academia altogether. His motivation to
“disobey” arose from a physical repositioning of
himself with respect to the subjects of his research,
one that forced him to readmit into his research
those for whom the research mattered. As Bunge
reflected, he had to “sight” rather than “cite” (Bunge
1979, 172). The methods needed were increasingly
defined by what he was studying rather than a
supposed academic value of the methods them-
selves. Hewas forced to find newways of consulting
with what he was researching, one where the
subjects of his research were given a much stronger
“right of reply.”
Bunge, and co-workers, conceived their physical
repositioning as a geographical expedition, one as
concerned with teaching as it was with research
(Heyman 2007). At first glance, the term “expedi-
tion” is unfortunate because of its association with
the utilitarian purpose of bringing the world under
the sovereignty of science, notably in the 19th
century (Withers 2007)—and the association of
19th- and early 20th-century academic geography
with the justification of sovereign expansion more
generally (Couper and Ansell 2012). The kind of
expedition that Bunge advocates and which I
support here is not a colonizing one. Rather, it is a
means of placing oneself in a situation where that
situation can speak back, engendering the kind of
slowing down of reason that Stengers advocates,
and which raises within us a slightly different sense
of awareness of what we think it is we know, and
hence what it is we set out to do (Stengers 2005).
Expeditions to Pickering and Uckﬁeld
In the final section of this paper I want to interpret
my own engagement in a project, Understanding
environmental knowledge controversies, within a
wider interdisciplinary research programme
Rural Economy and Land Use (RELU), as a kind of
geographical expedition of the sort that Bunge
envisages and which (at least in retrospect) can
be interpreted as a kind of slow science. The
project has been described widely elsewhere (e.g.,
Landstr€om et al. 2011; Lane et al. 2011). In brief,
the project was an experiment in participatory
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knowledge production (or co-production). The
project sought to understand the ways in which
controversies surrounding scientific knowledge, in
our case in relation to flooding, might be harnessed
andworkedwith so as to generate the new collective
competencies (in members of the public, in scien-
tists, in action groups) that might move a problem
on. This was done through an experimental method
using “environmental competency groups,” one in
each town. This method had five elements (see Lane
et al. 2011 for more detail): (1) a focus on actively
producing newknowledge relating to flooding in the
two towns rather than just discussion and debate;
(2) a collaborative process involving academics
and community members, as well as “things” (e.g.,
computer models, maps, measurements), the latter
providing a critical role in mediating between
members of each group and with the place within
which the groups were working; (3) a sustained
engagement over 12 months with a “matter of
concern,” i.e., flooding, that can bring into sharp
focus the prevailing framings associated with flood-
ing and the people and things bound to it, so
mobilizing and enabling those people and things
otherwise excluded from floodmanagement; (4) the
acceptance that expertise regarding flooding is
deeply distributed amongst experts (members of
the public and scientists) rather than being confined
to those certified as such (i.e., academics); and (5) an
approach that did not seek to represent any pre-
existing constituency with regard to flooding, but
rather that sought to constitute a new public
capable of intervening in flood risk management.
The notion that we embarked upon geographical
expeditions is reflected in the material ways in
which elements (1) through (5) were put into
practice. We spent sustained periods of time in
both towns, Pickering between 2007 and 2008, and
Uckfield between 2008 and 2009, holding compe-
tency group meetings in each (six evening meetings
per expedition, each 3 to 4 hours long), jointly
collecting data with local members, attending
additional inter-meeting events (e.g., reading
groups), and undertaking inter-meeting interviews
with local members as well as with other key
stakeholders with an interest in flooding in each
place. In retrospect, we should have lived in each
town for a period of time, something that may
appear to be impossible given current University
schedules, but which some disciplines at least (e.g.,
Anthropology) are able to sustain. But the expedi-
tionwasnot simply a “field trip.”Table 3 attempts to
show some of the shared characteristics with
Bunge’s notions of a geographical expedition
(Table 2) and the ideas of Stengers summarized in
Table 1. The expeditions themselves grew out of a
project that advocated a very different kind of
interdisciplinarity to that sought by the programme
Table 2
The interpretation of Stengers’ (2013) actions through a reading of Bunge (1979)
Stengers’ actions Illustrations from Bunge (1979)
1. Acts of disobedience I threw myself into the peace movement when it was supported at that time by less than four percent of the American
people. Having lived through McCarthyism, I fully expected to be in a concentration camp within a year. (Bunge
1979, 170)
2. Repositioning of the
scientist
I went to Chicago for the Martin Luther King demonstrations in 1966. While there I stayed in the black ghetto in a
hotel at 67th and Stony Island. (Bunge 1979, 170)
3. Readmission of
consequence
It is easier to rouse working class mothers and fathers to maps showing the region in which children have shrunken
heads due to lack of protein . . . the actual human misery the money transfers cause is more difficult to perceive
than the flows. (Bunge 1979, 172)
4. New ways of working The campus geographers tend to separate theory from practice. They read too much and look and, often, struggle
not at all. They cite, not sight . . . In science the methodology does not endorse itself. Only the substance
recommends the methodology. (Bunge 1979, 171)
5. The “art of
consultation”
I worked with a young black woman, a union worker, and former peddler on 43rd Street, Rene Spears. She hated my
concern about the three dimensionality of the species and our need to protect the world’s children. Her people’s
children were starving. (Bunge 1979, 170)
6. The “right of reply” Another young black woman, Gwendolyn Warren, from Fitzgerald in Detroit . . . was teaching me similar lessons,
filled with hatred toward me because I did not notice the children being murdered by automobiles in front of their
homes or children starving in front of abundant food. “Immediacy” was their cry, “To Hell with the World”! (Bunge
1979, 170)
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that funded it. It required a continual articulation
between what we wanted the project to achieve and
what the programmewas increasingly emphasizing,
such as research impact (for further details, see
Whatmore 2013). Those scientists involved in the
project were forced, through direct contact with the
matter of concern, to turn away from their normal
working communities and to focus on those who
lived in the place in which they were based (see
Landstr€omet al. 2011). Doing someant that the local
consequences of knowledge producedwere brought
to the fore.Much of thiswas achieved through a very
radical way of practicing science which avoided the
supposed separation of the scientist from the
subjects of their research, where the latter were
actively involved in both deliberating on the ques-
tions that should be asked and developing the tools
(e.g., mathematical models) to answer them (see
Lane et al. 2011). We also had to learn to consult in
newways, to come to termswith the inadequacies of
our own conceptualization of flooding problems,
and ultimately to become sensitized to the ques-
tions posed by those for whom flooding was a
matter of concern.
Table 3
The interpretation of Stengers’ (2013) actions through my own expeditions to Pickering and Uckﬁeld
Stengers’ actions
Illustrations from the Environmental Knowledge Controversies project, a project that ran from 2007 to
2010 in the 2004 to 2013 Rural Economy and Land Use programme, an initiative straddling three UK
research councils (Natural Environment, Economic and Social, Biotechnology and Biological) and whose
origins can be traced back to the UK government’s response to the (rural) foot and mouth crisis of 2001
to 2002.
1. Acts of disobedience Getting the project funded: Whatmore (2013) explains the challenges associated with getting a project funded where
we (the applicants) clearly had visions of different kinds of interdisciplinarity to those of the civil servants
associated with managing the research programme (the PMG, Programme Management Group). For instance, in
response to cuts to the project funding, the PMG refused to countenance our proposition to focus on floods and
insisted that the entire project be re-reviewed. They wanted us to avoid collecting new data and focus on the
analysis and interpretation of existing data.
2. Repositioning of the
scientist
The realignment of the project scientists away from the hydrological community and towards those of the
communities with whom we were doing the science: Landstr€om et al. (2011) describe how the two project
scientists (Stuart Lane and Nick Odoni) were forced to turn away from their conventional network of scientific
practice (based upon a particular kind of hydrological model) to the network of academics and local people




In both expeditions, we were dealing with communities living with flooding and its consequences. In the Pickering
case, we advertised for community members to work with on Friday 22nd June 2007 and the major flooding began
in the town on Monday 25th June 2007. Consequence was materially readmitted and the approaches we developed
became sensitive to wider impacts (e.g., the importance of storing water, but not in a way that would damage the
local tourist railway; the need to show attention to the effects of flow attenuation by upstream storage for the
relative timing of flood waves downstream, and hence downstream flood risk).
4. New ways of working Central to the expeditions was the redistribution of admitted competence: Lane et al. (2011) describe this as an
experiment in radical scientific method because, rather than restricting engagement with communities to public
understanding or public deliberation of extant scientific findings, the science that we did was co-produced.
Through a series of working meetings we scoped the issues; together developed and used a hydrological model;
and discussed the results leading to: (1) a public exhibition in Pickering, and (2) proposals for distributed instream
and floodplain interventions to attenuate river flow in Uckfield.
5. The “art of
consultation”
A critical challenge for the academics involved in both expeditions was overcoming the perception of academics as
part of the establishment (e.g., funded by the Environment Agency, even though we weren’t) and as experts. We
were both chastised for solving the wrong problems. As one community member put it: “And particularly about
flood science. My concern is why when so much money is poured into research and mapping etc. . . . it doesn’t get
better. It has to be possible to make something better, to actually solve problems that people need solving and so
this is my concern and that also a concern of this project, which I have really bought into it.”. We had to learn to
recognize the deep and sophisticated (if not certified) knowledge of flooding held by community members (see
Lane et al. 2011).
6. The “right of reply” We attempted to go into both locations with a minimum of prior framing (the only framing was that flooding should
be a matter of concern), and then to shape the research questions that we wished to ask through the negotiation
and deliberation by all members of the environmental competency groups.
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Since the project ended in 2010, and being
somewhat distant from some of the follow-up
work and studies that have resulted, I can now
reflect more critically upon what the project
achieved. At one level, the project did produce a
number of research publications (e.g., Landstr€om
et al. 2011; Lane et al. 2011) that certainly fulfilled
RELU’s objective in their 2004 call for proposals of
developing: “. . . integrated perspectives on prob-
lems and to understand complex processes and
issues involved in achieving sustainable rural
development . . .” through “. . . an approach that
effectively combines research staff, methods and
perspectives from social and natural science dis-
ciplines.” Perhaps reflecting RELU’s emphasis, these
publications have appeared almost exclusively in
social science– facing journals. If judged in terms of
conventional natural science, the project was a
failure. We have not published any kind of new
(commercial) modelling tool. The hydrological/
hydraulic modelling work done for Pickering and
Uckfield, which was hybrid, has not been published.
The only real publication based on the modelling
involved collaboration with a different research
group, in a different location, to test the effects of
log jams on downstream flood risk (Dixon et al.
2016). We produced three reviews (two book
chapters and a journal review article) prompted by
our experience with our modelling, none of them
addressing the model approach/results themselves
and none of them eligible in the kinds of accounting
systems that UK universities now use (e.g., publica-
tion of primary research results in Physical Geogra-
phy or natural science journals with a high Impact
Factor). With reference to Figure 2, the project
produced very little natural science Surplus, at least
in the way Surplus has come to be valued in the
University audit culture of the 21st century, and this
despite a significant expenditure of Labour and
Resource.ix Producing such publications might have
been possible and perhaps, had I been an early-
career researcher, critical to some of the disciplin-
ary and sub-disciplinary modes of evaluation I
might be subject to (e.g., Research Council grant
applications, Research Excellence Framework). But
such production would have required the science
thatwe did to be discipline-facing, i.e., based around
the state of hydrological modelling as it currently is,
and not subject-facing, i.e., addressing the concerns
of the flood risk communities with which we
worked. Whilst the flood risk management solu-
tions that our project developed in Pickering, in
particular, went on to be implemented and nation-
ally recognized and to sustain debates over a more
catchment-based approach to flood risk manage-
ment,x there was no Surplus in the natural science
terms that now dominate the academy. My point
here is that following the kinds of principles that
Stengers (2013) advocates (e.g., Table 1) is not just
about an epistemological shift regarding the nature
of the knowledge production process, but also
about a deeper ontological shift in the nature and
purpose of scientific enquiry, one that challenges
directly what research in the academy has become.
The challenges facing early-career researchers are
such that the risks of pursuing such an ontological
shift are serious, even if an early-career researcher
may be highly motivated by the excitement that
comes from doing something differently. More
senior researchers, better able to cope with the
negative consequences of this risk, are more likely
to be locked into the kind of system shown in
Figure 2, that is they have become closer to being an
owner of the Means of Production and the manage-
ment of the crises that the system is producing. Yet,
it is probably those of us who are more senior that
are most able to support and to sustain the wider
changes in working practice (e.g., Pain 2014; Rogers
et al. 2014; Mountz et al. 2015) and to value the
kinds of geographical imagination (e.g., Castree
2016) that would provide the safe and secure
University context needed for the ralentissement
that Stengers (2013) advocates.
But, labelling our contributions as a failure in
terms of 21st-century Surplus would hide a much
deeper set of challenges that this work threw up.
Landstr€om et al. (2011) described how the natural
scientists in the project (my colleague and I) turned
away from our academic research networks and
towards the local communities with whom we were
ixThe project was funded before application of the UK’s Full
Economic Costing of research projects. The direct costs of the
project allowed employment of a project administrator and three
post-doctoral fellows for three years, associated travel/subsis-
tence costs, and a fourth post-doctoral fellow to assist with
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working whilst developing the hydrological mod-
els used in the project. This repositioning was not
just about model making, it was about a deeper
shift in the locus of our entire research activities.
Pickering at first, then Uckfield, took over. My
other research projects fell behind and suffered,
and other commitments could not be properly
honoured, because of the ways in which we had
become imbricated within the day-to-day rolling
on of those living with flooding risk in these two
towns. I could not find more time, but there was a
sense in which these expeditions were “eventful”
time per Meyerhoff et al. (2011) where, through a
process of collective innovation, we instigated a
wider debate about how to do flood risk science
and to address flood risk problems. It was the
readmission of the subjects into our work as
scientists that shifted us towards what Mountz
et al. (2015, 1245) call a more “care-full” scholar-
ship. In that sense, I have concluded that a lack of a
natural science Surplus simply did not and does
not matter.
Conclusion
To conclude, I want to return to some of the lessons
of David Harvey (1972) where he argues that in a
normative account of the world, the goal must be
not to produce largely correct accounts of that
world (in his case, Von Th€unen’s theory of urban
land use, where competitive bidding leads to the
urban poor moving where they can least afford to
live), but rather to identify precisely those condi-
tions that might cause the largely correct models to
be incorrect (i.e., in his case, those conditions that
might allow competitive bidding to be replaced by a
socially controlled urban land market). I find this to
be precisely the moment when as a scientist I make
some kind of progress in my understanding. In
relation to our work as physical geographers,
conceptual statements or quantitative predictions
are not the end point. Rather, our challenge is to
reorient attention away from pursuit of (largely)
correct (but uncertain) predictions of how the
environment is changing (or will change). We need
to engage much more closely with two challenges.
The first challenge centres on those points that
don’t fit the model and so cause us to look slightly
more closely at why, slowing down our reasoning, to
the point at which other explanationsmight become
meaningful and new questions important. It is right
to be wrong (see Beven 2016). The second is to
become more willing to address the plethora of
constraints, contradictions and feedbacks, political,
socio-cultural, economic, and environmental that
need to be challenged such that those predictions
become invalid. I sense that Physical Geography
contributes significantly to the first challenge
through what might be called “normal science,”
notwithstanding what the University system has
become and the pressure for what we do to be
impactful, and the creative destruction of Geogra-
phy that has been needed to do this. But the
contributions to the second challenge remain the
exception to the norm, not least because sustaining
the creative destruction of modern Physical Geog-
raphy requires the reinforcement of a model of
scientific enquiry that separates scientists from the
subjects of their science. Critical Physical Geogra-
phy (Lave et al. 2014) is exciting here. But, the
arguments of Stengers (2013) and the parallels with
Bunge (1979) seem so interesting because they
remind us of the power of the subjects of our
research, human or non-human,xi to speak back, if
we allow them to do so, and hence engender that
slightly different understanding of the world
around us, one that makes the curious practice of
science so creative and exciting. Even if it is unlikely
to break completely the model shown in Figure 2, a
21st-century vision of the (physical) geographical
expedition, that can be sensitive to the serious
issues that notions of expedition imply for our
research practices, merits careful attention.
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